This paper presents a theoretical median voter analysis of the determination of the level of social security. The framework for the analysis is a continuoustime overlapping-generations model with non-altruistic households facing borrowing constraints in the capital market. A majority voting equilibrium is shown to exist, in which the median voter is liquidity constrained. The desired level of social security for each voter is a declining function of the pre-existing level of social security. As a consequence, in a sequence of votes on social security beginning with a zero level, the program initially overshoots its steady state value.
ity levels will be lower in the presence of uncertainty, and savings higher. Uncertainty plays a crucial role in this model by generating an internal solution to the level of social security preferred by the median voter. In the absence of such uncertainty, the median voter, would either prefer zero or an indefinitely large amount of social security depending on whether the implicit rate of return on social security over his remaining life was negative or positive.
Hu's analysis has the merit of incorporating social security decision-making into a model in which capital markets and saving play an explicit role. However, its formulation of uncertainty about future voting is rather ad hoc since it is simply postulated that the future level of social security is a random variable whose expected value increases with the level of social security currently chosen. This formulation links present decisions to future outcomes and is critical in generating the results.5 Other assumptions which play a key role in the analysis include the specification of a three-period lifetime, the supposition that votes are taken each period (and thus three times per lifetime) and the implicit assumption that the previously existing level of social security has no impact on levels desired by current voters. Finally, the qualitative nature of Hu's results do not allow him to analyze the path that social security levels follow over time.
Part of the purpose of our paper is to analyze the dynamic evolution of the social security system over time in a stylized economy. We use a model of overlapping generations in which a large number of generations are alive at any one time, and in which internal majority voting equilibria are obtained by imposing realistic capital market constraints on voters. In a sense, our model is a compromise between Browning's assumption of no capital markets and the assumption that capital markets are perfect. A full specification of voter saving behavior under these constraints allows us to show how preferred social security levels depend upon previously existing ones.
It quickly becomes apparent when undertaking median voter analyses of social security levels in a fully specified model that the problem is inherently complicated, both conceptually and analytically, by its dynamic nature and by the manner in which different generations of households interact with one another. The median voter's choice of social security will depend both upon past social security levels, which determine the circumstances under which past savings decisions have been made, and upon the future evolution of the system, which may depend upon how future median voters behave. A median voter's decision should take account of the fact that his choice of social security will have an influence on the level chosen by subsequent median voters during his lifetime. Since these next median voters will affect subsequent ones and so on into the future, the forwardlooking median voter would have to solve the future evolution of the system taking into account the mutual consistency of his decision with those of the sequence of future median voters. Such a dynamic system is immensely difficult to analyze. Different authors have made different assumptions to resolve this problem. Browning (1975) assumes that current voters behave as if the scheme they choose will be in effect for the remainder of their lives. This would be the case if votes were taken infrequently or if one were only considering long-run equilibria. Hu (1982) and Verbon (1987) assume that the outcomes of future median votes are uncertain, but positively linked to the current outcome. Sjoblom (1985) treats the choice of social security levels of successive generations as a dynamic game in which failure by a generation to maintain the existing level of social security is punished by the next generation.
In common with previous authors, we adopt a set of institutional and behavioral assumptions which allow us to abstract from some of these complexities. Depending on the context, our analysis can be interpreted either as applying for steady states as in Browning (1975) or for economies in which votes are taken infrequently over social security levels. In either case, the model is not fully descriptive of the dynamic evolution of a general economy with frequent voting.6 Nonetheless, our results are suggestive of the sorts of forces at work, which one would expect to reappear, though possibly with added complexitites, in more detailed analyses.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional and behavioral assumptions of the model. This is followed by an analysis of the life-cycle savings-consumption pattern of a typical household of arbitrary age under a social security system of given size. Section 4 investigates the consequences of changing the size of the social security program on household welfare and, from this, deduces the preferences for social security levels. Two key features of this analysis are the demonstration that preferences for social security levels are single-peaked and the finding of an inverse relationship between the mostpreferred social security level and the previously-existing level. Section 5 analyses how the preferred level of social security varies with age, allowing us to identify the median voter and to show certain properties of the median voter equilibrium. Section 6 traces out the dynamic evolution of median voter equilibria in an economy in which votes are taken infrequently. It is shown that starting from zero the chosen level of social security typically overshoots the steady state level and then falls. In certain circumstances, it gradually converges to the steady state level; in others it does not. A concluding section reiterates some key implications of our analysis and considers some directions for future research.
THE INSTITUTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
The model we use abstracts from all aspects of policy except for intergenerational transfers. In particular, all households are assumed identical to avoid " Among other things, our assumptions permit us to ignore the anticipated effect of current votes on future votes. Other sorts of "conjectural variations" of the effect of current choices on subsequent choices are clearly possible, as discussed in Section 7 of the earlier version of this paper (Boadway and Wildasin, 1987) and in a companion paper, Boadway and Wildasin (forthcoming). The analysis in those papers indicates the importance of the frequency with which votes are taken as well as the perceptions held by current voters about the behavior of future voters. intragenerational redistribution effects. The model we use is essentially the continuous-time overlapping-generations model with perfect certainty originally analyzed by Cass and Yaari (1967) . Each household begins economic life at age 0, works until age R and is retired until life's end T. Labor supply is fixed during the working period and a given stream of labor income is received, denoted wS (O < s < R). During retirement, no labor income is earned; consumption is financed from earlier savings or from social security benefits. Households leave no bequests, although that does not seem to affect the qualitative nature of the analysis unless bequests are operative in the sense of Barro (1974) . Households are born (and die) continuously at a rate which increases exponentially at the rate n. This fixed exponential growth rate ensures a constant age-distribution of the population. Of particular importance for us is the person of median age, denoted in. Since the age-distribution of the population is fixed, so will be the median age. The production side of the model is kept very simple. It is assumed that producer prices are exogenously fixed. Thus, the interest rate -r is fixed and so is the wage rate in terms of the single consumption good, though wage payments ws can vary over the life cycle due to variable amounts of effective labor supplied. This assumption of fixed interest and wage rates can be interpreted as assuming either a linear production technology or a small open economy.7
Intergenerational transfer policy is modelled as a tax-transfer scheme according to which all working persons pay a constant stream of taxes of -per unit of time and all retirees receive a constant stream of benefits per unit of time /3. The government budget is assumed to be balanced instantaneously, so The median voter is assumed to choose the value of / which maximizes his remaining lifetime utility. It is assumed that the median voter believes that, once chosen, the value of /3 will remain unchanged for the remainder of his lifetime. This is a strong assumption which will be satisfied under one of the two circumstances discussed above infrequent voting or steady state. Note that in a steady state, not only will future values of /3 be unchanged at At! but also the value of / which existed for the prior portion of the median voter's life will be ,/, as well.
Variability of factor prices would complicate the dynamic analysis of policy changes enormously. The median voter would have to predict the future path of factor prices resulting from the change in capital stock due to policy changes. At the same time, as discussed below, the assumption of fixed factor prices eliminates one avenue by which the welfare of the median voter would eventually stop rising as social security levels increase.
Under the infrequent voting assumption, when /3 $ /,B, at the time of voting, the median voter may choose to change /3. Which of these two assumptions is being made will be specified in the analysis.
For a voter of a given age, the net present value of a dollar's worth of social security benefits can be calculated. Following Feldstein (1974), we refer to this as the net social security wealth per dollar of social security benefits. If capital markets are perfect, the utility of the median voter will be monotonically increasing in net social security wealth, and hence monotonic in /3. If net social security wealth is negative, the median voter chooses /3 = 0. If it is positive, he chooses the maximum possible level of social security. This level, denoted womax is the level which would tax away all the wealth of the working generations.8 These extreme outcomes were those obtained by Hu (1982) for the case of infrequent voting.
There are various ways to amend the model so as to avoid such extreme outcomes. One might make factor prices, pre-retirement labor supply or retirement age endogenous. Or, one could introduce uncertainty about the future as in Hu (1982) . We assume instead that capital markets are imperfect in one or both of two ways. First, households may not be able to borrow against future after-tax wage income. The empirical validity and some of the long-run consequences of this assumption have been discussed in detail by Hubbard and Judd (1986) . Second, households may be unable to borrow against future social security benefits. This restriction might be viewed as appropriate in view of the absence of explicit contractual guarantees on future social security levels. In addition, the fact that many benefits in retirement may be in-kind transfers or may be thought of as annuities whose asset value becomes zero on death makes the inability to borrow against them reasonable.9 As analyzed below, these constraints imply that a positive wealth effect due to social security increases is eventually overcome by a loss of welfare due to the inability to borrow.
THE LIFE-CYCLE BEHAVIOR OF LIQUIDITY-CONSTRAINED HOUSEHOLDS
Consider a person of age t who has accumulated a certain amount of wealth according to his utility-maximizing asset profile under the social security scheme previously in existence, denoted /3*. Let us first characterize the allocation problem for the remainder of his life under some new scheme /3 which begins at t and continues for the remainder of his life cycle (T -t). Adopting an additivelyseparable lifetime utility function with strictly concave instantaneous utility u, the consumer problem is: with the initial condition At At(/P").'0 Here, cs is consumption, As is assets, ws is the exogenous wage (=z 0 for s > R), /3s is social security benefits and rs is taxes. Note that f3= 0 for t < s < R and /3 for s > R, and Ts = r for t < s < r and 0 for s > R. Recall from (1) that r = z-sh.
The non-negativity constraint on As will be used to characterize various liquidity constraints facing households. Depending on the interval S. the constraint will correspond to an inability to borrow against future social security benefits, future wages, or both. As discussed below, each of these cases will involve imposing certain regularity conditions on the paths of wages, consumption, and social security benefits, for simplicity.
The constant value Hamiltonian function for this problem may be written: At some finite number of points, as may jump discontinuously so (4) will not apply. The points at which this occurs will be discussed below. Taking the time derivative of (3), substituting into (4) and simplifying we obtain:
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Asi where E =-iitc5/t' (the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption), which we take to be constant for simplicity. This implies the utility function takes the form (1-I c(l'I)! > 0. Note also that ps = 0 if As > 0; conversely, if ps > 0 then As 0. In general, the path of cs will depend upon the exogenous parameters, including /3. For future use, note that cs will be twice differentiable in /3 except at those points where ;,, jumps discontinuously.
From (6), the path of consumption depends on whether and when a liquidity constraint is binding. We can distinguish four cases as follows. BENEFIT CONSTRAINT BINDING require that the wage stream rise more rapidly than the consumption stream. We will also assume that the consumer's optimal consumption stream is such that AR > 0, to rule out the possibility of borrowing against future social security benefits. In these circumstances, the non-negativity constaint in (2) " Notice that the point h will coincide with t if the household is earnings-constrained to begin with. Also, for some earning streams, it would be possible for there to be more than one segment of the working period when the earnings constraint binds. For simplicity, we ignore that possibility in this paper. Note that both { 
VOTER PREFERENCES OVER SOCIAL SECURITY LEVELS
Voter preferences for /3 depend upon how the welfare of the voter varies with /3. In this section, we present a welfare analysis of the effects of changes in /3 on household utility over the remaining lifetime as a basis for deducing preferences defined over /X.
For given values of factor prices (ws, r) and demographic variables (n, R, T), the time path of consumption c, can be viewed as depending upon the level of wealth effect increases as t rises (or becomes less negative). For t > R. the wealth effect is necessarily positive. Hence, if n > r, preferences will be monotonically increasing in /3 for voters of all ages. If r > n, there will be a voter of a particular age for whom the wealth effect is zero. All younger voters will have negative wealth effects and monotonically decreasing preferences for /3; all older voters will have positive wealth effects and monotonically increasing preferences for /3.
Benefit constraint binding. Suppose either that workers can borrow against future wages or that wS = w (O ? s < R) so that the liquidity constraint will only arise as a result of an inability to borrow against future social security benefits (Figure 2) . In this case, V'(/3; /30) is given by (11). Define JR = e-r(R-t),twhere (5R > 0, due to the liquidity constraint which requires AR = 0. Equation ( 11) can therefore be rewritten:
VM(/; /30) = ;t(e r(R )AR T -qtiR.) -J ART
The term with the coefficient At is the wealth effect (as in (12)) and the last term is the reduction in welfare due to the presence of the distortion. Thus, an increase in /3 will have a wealth effect as before (which may be positive or negative) and a negative distorting effect. Note that the distorting effect will only apply for persons aged t < R. Vt will be negative for large enough /3. To see this, use (3) to rewrite (1 1) as: So far in discussing voter preferences, we have taken as given the parameters exogenous to the problem. In analyzing possible patterns for the evolution of social security through time, it will be useful to investigate how consumer preferences, particularly the location of the most-preferred level of /3, depend upon the pre-existing level /30. To do so involves undertaking a comparative static analysis on the implicit demand for social security.
Consider a voter aged t < R with a positive wealth effect. The level of social security which he prefers, denoted /3*, will be that satisfying: Since the wealth effect of social security is always greater for older individuals, the median voter will be the voter of median age. The sign of his wealth effect will determine which of these extreme outcomes is obtained.
When liquidity constraints are present, extreme types of equilibria need not occur. We shall show this first for the case where only the benefit constraint can arise and later discuss the earnings-constrained case.
Benefit constraint binding. To analyze majority voting equilibria in this case requires first that we investigate the way that the benefit constraint will affect households of different ages. To begin with, note that increases in the level of social security for a person of age t will eventually cause the benefits constraint to become binding. One useful result that can be obtained is that the level of / at which the benefit constraint just becomes binding increases with the age in the life cycle at which the 3 changes are introduced.
To show this, consider a person of age t who has faced a social security level of /3? up to age t. That person will have planned a stream of consumption c' which changes exponentially at the rate (r -6)e. Suppose this person is not benefitconstrained given /Po and suppose /3 is increased until the benefit constraint is just binding. From the consumer's budget constraint, the change in consumption Acs must satisfy: ; er(s Ac ds = Afl(J e-r(s-t) dsfR e-r(s-t) ds) where the right-hand side is the change in social security wealth at age t. Also, from the fact that the constraint just binds, retirement consumption is financed from social security benefits. Therefore, Since the right-hand side, the change in social security wealth for a person aged k, is greater than the corresponding change for the person aged t < k, the change in consumption after age k everywhere dominates that for person t. In particular, after age R, the present value of consumption for the person initially of age k is greater than that for the person of age t. Since they receive the same social security benefits,
r~~~~~T T e-rs -k)(Co + Ac') d/s > fT er(s k)/3 ds.
Therefore, AR > 0 for the person aged k, who is therefore not benefit-constrained. By an identical argument, all persons younger than t when the change is introduced will be benefit-constrained if person t is. A similar argument obtains when the person aged t is initially constrained. If so, one reduces /3 to the level at which t is just constrained. The remainder of the argument goes through with obvious changes. Thus, we have established that if the only borrowing constraint is the inability to borrow against future social security benefits, the level of social security which, when introduced at age t, just causes the benefit constraint to bind will be increasing in t. Equivalently, if a household of age t is benefitconstrained at a given level of social security, all households of age s < t will also be benefit-constrained. With this preliminary result, we can now discuss majority voting equilibria. First, let in represent median age, and consider /3*, the ideal level of social security benefits for voter tin, given /30. Assume that in < R, and that the social security wealth effect for this individual is positive. We know that 0 < In other words, when the voter of median age prefers a reduction in the size of the social security program, so will a majority of voters. The majority voting equilibrium level of /3, however, need not coincide with /3*.
To prove this proposition, we argue by contradiction. Let q be the median voter,'8 and suppose /3l > /3g. By argument identical to that given in the proof of Proposition 3, we can show that all voters of age t > q prefer a higher level of /3 than /13, and all younger voters prefer less. Hence q = m and /3* = /*? > /3. This contradicts the hypothesis that /3* < /P?, proving the desired result.
Earnings constraint binding. Essentially identical results obtain when households are earnings-constrained (or when both types of constraints can occur). The one added qualification here is that the path of wages must be sufficiently regular so that, when a vote is taken, each household will choose a consumption path for the rest of the life cycle along which the earnings constraint will be binding for at most one interval of time. A sufficient regularity condition is that the net earnings stream should cut the optimal consumption path only once, lying below it up to a certain critical time and above it thereafter. Given this condition, all of the previous results for the benefit-constrained case apply directly to the general case. That is, if a voter of age t is constrained by either type of constraint (or both), so will be all voters of age s < t. If >3* 2 /,0 the median-aged voter is the median voter (Proposition 3), and if /al < [O, the median voter prefers a social security level less that /30 (Proposition 4). Henceforth, Proposition 3 and 4 should be understood as holding in this general case.
The proof of these propositions are omitted here for the sake of brevity. The general line of argument is identical to that given for the benefit-constrained case.
'1 It should be noted that q may not be unique. That is, there may be more than one voter who has the median demand for social security fS*. However, the median demand /* will itself be unique by single-peakedness of preferences. Tracing out the dynamics of economies responding to policy changes is inherently complicated even in a model as simple as ours in which only one type of economic decision is taken (saving/consumption) and only one policy variable is used (social security /3). Some simplifying assumptions must necessarily be made.
We begin by assuming that the median-aged person will be the median voter, and that only the benefit constraint applies. However, for decreases in /3, the median voter may not be median-aged. Proposition 4 shows that if the median voter prefers 3 to fall, so will the majority of voters. The implication of this for the above analysis is that the increasing segments of the cycle will be determined as described by the curve /3*(/O). However, the decreases may differ from that. As a consequence, the overshooting will still occur and the steady state level /,,3 will be unchanged. However, convergence to /3). is not guaranteed. In the more general case in which both constraints bind, Propositions 7 and 8 continue to apply. As long as An > 0 for the median voter, overshooting can be expected to occur. If, however, AM,, = 0 in the steady state, the system will go to the steady state either immediately or after one period of overshooting.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The intention of this paper has been to analyze, in the context of a fullyspecified dynamic model, the sequence of social security levels that would be chosen by median voters. In order to make the analysis manageable we have had to impose strong assumptions. Doing so has allowed us to concentrate our attention on the precise interactions between social security levels and asset accumulation, and on the implications of this interaction for voter preferences over social security levels. Although our analysis cannot be taken literally as a description of history even in the counterfactual sense, it is suggestive of some of the sorts of influences that must be taken into account in further work in this area. We have particularly tried to indicate some of the main issues involved in modelling policies in a dynamic economy.
One of the main messages is that dynamic policy modelling is inherently complicated both analytically and conceptually. When one tries to incorporate overlapping generations and capital market equilibria in a realistic manner, the full evaluation of alternative policies by a current generation of voters will typically require information both on the history of past policies (which can be taken as given) and on the sequence of future policies (which themselves will be partly determined by current decisions). This presents a formidable analytical task. Attempts to avoid or limit these interdependencies by, for example, restricting analysis to two-or three-period life-cycles may unwittingly assume away some important interactions. These models by their very nature restrict both the frequency with which votes are taken over the life cycle and the number of generations which can be alive at a given time. Similarly, analyzing overlappinggenerations models without including full capital markets can be misleading.
Despite the restrictiveness of our assumptions, the qualitative nature of the results are in accordance with some stylized facts. The general result that newlyintroduced social security systems initially overshoot the long-run equilibrium and then fall seems to accord with a pattern noted by Verbon (forthcoming) for many public pension systems. Also, the result we obtain of positive social security levels above the long-run welfare-maximizing level but less than the maximumpossible level corresponds both with that obtained by previous authors (Browning 1975; Hu 1982; Sjoblom 1985) and with that alleged to exist in practice (Feldstein 1974 ).
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